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Abstract The theory of efficient policy instruments for agricultural pollution control
has been evolving. Some new developments suggest that policies using financial
incentives to encourage desirable farming practices are superior to those focusing on
runoff directly or restrictions on farming practices. However, the theoretical models
used to derive such results make assumptions about conditions that may not hold. As
a result, implementation of the findings of such models is not necessarily routine.
This article attempts to summarize these studies and interpret their implications for
agricultural nonpoint source pollution control for the Chesapeake Bay.
Introduction
Reducing pollution loads from agricultural sources is a key objective of plans for the
restoration and protection of Chesapeake Bay. The extent of the agricultural control that
will be required in the various river basins to meet clean-up goals is not yet well defmed.
But whatever the levels ultimately sought, achieving them will required changes in the
way farmers produce and, therefore, additional public intervention in farm decision
making.
The traditional economic concern when evaluating alternative policy approaches is
minimizing the economic burden of pollution and its control or, more formally, achiev-
ing economic efficiency. In the traditional use of the concept, efficient pollution control
requires three things: (1) the use of least-cost control technologies by polluters, (2) a
least-cost allocation of control among polluters, and (3) a level of control that maximizes
the difference between the social benefits and the costs of control. The first and second
requirements are conditions of cost-effective control, whereas the third defines the eco-
nomically optimal level of control.
Much of the economic literature on pollution control is focused on the design of
policy to achieve efficient or, less ambitiously, cost-effective control when discharges by
individual polluters can be accurately monitored at reasonable cost and the polluters are
able to regulate their discharges with precision. These two conditions characterize many
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industrial and municipal point source pollution situations reasonably well, but not agri-
cultural or other nonpoint source pollution situations. The diffuse nature of nonpoint
pollution makes monitoring impractical. Moreover, farmers can regulate only some of
the many variables determining the quantity and quality of runoff from their farms.
There is a growing body of theoretical and empirical work concerned with efficient
agricultural nonpoint pollution control that explicitly takes the management Implications
of the key characteristics of nonpoint pollution into account. Our goal is to interpret and
summarize some major themes from this literature that should be of iise in developing ''.•'
economically sensible agricuhural programs for protection of Chesapeake Bay. ; . ••
Policy Options - , ' •};''•,/
Many metiiods are available fof pltfsuing .pollution cojUrbt in agricultvjmey onepopuliife .'. "^,
approach is the'combinatioii df educational pfogtams witSh, techhic^ assjsi^pe,.'TKe I '
premise underlying this approach is that farmers will voluntarily adopt pollution control, \ j .i .,
practices if informed of their social responsfbility, told what they can do to help nedpce ., ',!. ;-
the problem, and giveti sotVie'techaieal assistafiice; In implementirig the pollniion.;cQijht!ttr.r-V'c
practices. However, experience and logic suggest that firms in highly con&petitiyp raar-. i' ^
keis are unlikely to adopt and maintain costly pollution controls unless faced with same'
form of financial or regulatory compulsion (Baumol and Oates 1979; Bbhm aiK* Russell .'
1985; EK>-arid Shortie 1985). The fanners who must act to help clean up the Ohesiapeake '
are in this kind of situation. ' . /
Agricultural markets in the mid-Atlantic region are competitive and the pressures on
producers here, as in the rest of the United States, are increasing as agricultural markets
become increasingly national and international in scope. At the same time, rfcducing
government support of farmers is of growing interest. The existing financial problems in
agriculture, along with these future prospects, make it unrealistic to believe that the
average farmer will adopt pollution control measures if they are very costly.
Although knowledge of the costs of agricultural pollution abatement in regions im-
pacting Chesapeake Bay is growing, it is not yet sufficient to say much about th$ farm
income implications of significant control. However, economic studies on agricultural
areas across the nation, including a few in the Chesapeake Bay region, generally suggest
that reducing pollution from well-run farms will reduce farm income unless farmers are
provided with some kind of assistance (e.g., Alt and Heady 1977; Boggess et al.. 1980;
Kraiher et al. 1983; White and Partenheimer 1980; Young and Crowder 1987; Zinsgr et
al. 1985). Therefore, real progress will likely require direct regulation or economic
incentives designed to have a real impact on farm decisions. Accordingly, aiialysis will
be focused on such policies.
Direct regulation, especially using design standards, is the traditional method of
pollution control in the United States. Design standards for agricultural sources would
involve regulations pertaining to the ways farmers may produce and otherwise manage
their land. For example, to reduce nutrient losses, regulations could be imposed on the
levels, timing, and forms of nutrient applications to cropland. To reduce sediment deliv-
ery, farmers could be required to undertake specified erosion control or sediment reten-
tion measures.
An alternative to design standards is performance standards, which are regulations
pertaining to an observable outcome of the polluter's decisions. Performance standards
for a point source are typically related to the polluter's actual emissions, such as limitsAgriculture Nonpoint Source Pollution Control 261
on phosphorous or nitrogen emissions from sewage treatment plants. Such emissions-
based standards are not practical for agricultural control because the pollution contribu-
tions of individual farms are for all practical purposes unobservable. Moreover, even if
these cdntributi6ns werq practical to monitor, emissions-based standards would generally
be inadvisable given the stochastic nature of nonpOint pollution. Wsather, for example,
affects nonpoint pollution but is uncontrollable and imperfectly predictable. Holding
farmers responsible for outcomes beyond their control is not economically sensible pro-
vided they have exercisedreasonable prudence. To do so could result in excessively risk-
adverse results, such as the loss of farms that would otherwise remain in production with
an efficient control program.
Whereas emissions-based performance standards are impractical, other types of per-
formance standards can be considered. Models for estimating nonpoint pollutant flows
utilizing information on farm management practice, weather, soil characteristics, and
other relevant factors have been developed and are being improved (Crowder 1987;
Decoursey 1986). These models help evaluate technologies and plans for managing
problem and the stochastic nature of nonpoint pollution. In addition, estimates obtained
from such models can offer an alternative to actual flows as the basis for the application
of performance standards (Griffm and Bromley 1982; Harrington et al. 1985; Shortle
and Dunn, 1986a). For example, one approach for reducing sediment delivery would be
to impose limits on values of the Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) developed by
Wishmeier and Smith (1978) for soil conservation planning. Of course, models used for
this purpose can be expected to have their accuracy challenged and it is not clear that the
existing generation could survive a severe test.
The stochastic nature of nonpoint pollution has implications for the meaning of its
control. Specifically, since nonpoint pollution is stochastic, its control should be viewed
as improving the probability distribution of nonpoint pollution loads. It is not sensible to
say, for example, that a certain practice will reduce agricultural runoff by 50%, but it is
sensible to say that a practice would result in a 50% reduction on average. But if the
variability of pollution is important, as surely it must be, then the average reduction
should not be the sole concern. Progress in pollution control also must be viewed as
improving the variance and perhaps other features of the distribution. Pollution control
targets should be defined, and technologies and policies should be evaluated accordingly
(Beavis and Walker 1983; Shortle 1987).
As with direct regulations, economic incentives can be applied to farmer's actions or
to outcomes of their actions. For example, to diminish nutrient loads, taxes could be
imposed on nutrient applications or to an estimate of the nutrient losses from a farm
provided by a nonpoint loading model. As in the case of performance standards, incen-
tives applied to actual emissions are impractical because of the monitoring problem and
would be generally inadvisable even if emissions were monitorable because of the sto-
chastic nature of nonpoint pollution.
From a strictly technical per^xxtive, design standards are the clear choice for exerting
public control over the water quajjty impacts of agriculture. Economic incentives leave the
farmer with freedom to choose, thus diminishing the degree of direct public control.
Performance standards can diminish the farmer's flexibility, but it must be remembered
that practical performance standards for agriculture must be based on models, and models
are not the real thing. Indeed, they may not even closely approximate the real thing.
Although reducing farmers' flexibility is advantageous for technical regulation of the
offsite impacts of fanning, flexibility is desirable for cost-effective control. Farmers may
have specialized knowledge about their individual farm operations that is essential to the262 J. W. Dunn and J. S. Shortle
identification of cost-effective controls. Farmers are unlikely to volunteer this specialized
knowledge to help pollution control planners identify cost-effective controls if they per-
ceive that doing so would be contrary to their economic self-interest. Conversely, the
public sector actively engages in generating and delivering information to farmers. Hence,
the flow of information generally promotes the existence of a differential information
structure such that farmers would generally know more about their own on-farm costs of
pollution control practices than government authorities.
To illustrate the magnitude of the public uncertainty about the on-farm economics of
pollution control and the policy implications of differential information, consider the case
of agriculture in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. Cropland runoff from this area, which
has very intensive livestock farming, is a major source of nutrients flowing down the
Susquehanna River into Chesapeake Bay (EPA 1983). The conventional wisdom is that
many farmers in the area fertilize in excess of the levels required to maximize profits.
From this it is inferred that the economic well-being of fanners could be improved along
with the state of the bay by reduced fertilizer applications. In other words, pollution
control is not costly to the fanner, but in fact is beneficial.
But is this the case? The validity of the conventional wisdom is very difficult to test
empirically. There are, however, good reasons to be skeptical. First, whereas crop re-
sponse functions are quite uncertain, it is reasonable to believe that an experienced farmer
has a better working knowledge of crop response to fertilizer on his or her land than an
external observer. But even if farmers do apply at rates in excess of those required for
profit maximization, their behavior could be a risk response. For example, a recent study
using a simulation model of a representative Lancaster County dairy farm found that
uncertainty about crop response and the nutrient content of manure could lead risk-averse
farmers to rates of fertilizer application well in excess of those required for expected profit
maximization (McSweeny and Shortle 1987). The same study indicates that achieving
nutrient balance on such a farm could substantially reduce the income of risk-averse
farmers. This study and others in the region (e.g., Kramer et al. 1983; Young et al. 1985;
Young and Crowder 1987) suggest that common beliefs about the farm level economics
may be faulty and, therefore, that policies based on these beliefs, such as appeals for
voluntary action, may not have the desired impact.
Economic incentives would allow farmers to fully utilize their specialized private
knowledge to minimize the farm-level costs of pollution abatement. For example, a tax on
the farm-average USLE would encourage the farmer to choose those practices that reduce
this tax base to the extent that the resulting tax savings exceed the loss in pretax income
from changes in farm resource allocation. Of course, not all economic incentives are equal
in their ability to promote the minimization of control costs. Cost-sharing subsidies, for
example, promote the use of specified equipment or procedures that may not be least-cost
techniques. Similarly, standards are not necessarily equally poor in promoting the use of
farmers' specialized knowledge. Farmers faced with performance standards will utilize
their specialized knowledge to find the least-cost means of compliance. The same opportu-
nity would not be available with highly restrictive design standards.
Efficient Policy Design in Theory
Much of the economic challenge in designing efficient pollution control policies is iden-
tifying ways to provide polluters with the flexibility needed for cost-effective control
while still achieving environmental quality goals. Theoretical examinations of the speci-Agriculture Nonpoint Source Pollution Control 263
fication of efficient nonpoint source policies that recognize the impracticality of
emissions-based instruments have been made by Griffin and Bromley (1982) and Shortle
and Dunn (1986a). Both studies examine the four basic strategies for agricultural non-
point pollution control outlined above: design standards and incentives and performance
standards and incentives, with the performance-based policies applied to estimated pollu-
tion flows. Both studies assume that farmers seek to maximize their economic well-being
and neither explicitly includes the costs of administering the policies. From here they
diverge.
Griffin and Bromley assume that public planners (1) know the profitability of
alternative management practices to the farms, and (2) that the pollution loads from
individual farms could be predicted without error when the farmer's management
practices are observed. This error-free observation implies the use of a perfectly accu-
rate nonpoint pollution model and perfect prediction of weather and other exogenous
influences. Under these assumptions, public decision makers know the environmental
impact of any change in farm resource allocation, how farmers will adjust their re-
source allocation in response to any intervention, and also the least-cost methods for
achieving pollution control on farms and the least-cost allocation of pollution control
between farms. With these assumptions, it is not surprising that they demonstrate that
it is possible to design a policy of each type that is equally cost-effective. Empirical
studies of the relative cost-effectiveness of different agricultural abatement policies
have typically used similar assumptions (e.g., Miranowski et al. 1983; Seitz et al.
1978; Taylor and Frohberg 1977).
Less restrictive assumptions are used in Shortle and Dunn (1986a). Weather is recog-
nized to be imperfectly predictable and the nonpoint models are recognized to be imper-
fect, yet acceptable for policy use. Hence, public decision makers are uncertain of the
environmental impact of alternative control practices, but have probabilistic methods for
analyzing the impacts. Farmers and public decision makers are recognized to be uncer-
tain about the profitability of alternative management practices, but fanners have an
information advantage over the public planners with respect to the profitability of differ-
ent management practices on the farm. Hence, public planners will be uncertain how
farmers will respond to policy initiatives. This uncertainty, which translates into uncer-
tainty about the environmental impact of policies in addition to that associated with
imperfect knowledge of the natural world, can be reduced by stringent regulations.
Their analysis demonstrates that design incentives in the form of farm-specific taxes
on those management practices affecting pollution flows from farms can be specified to
outperform other types of design incentives and all types of design standards, estimated
performance standards, and estimated performance incentives for achieving efficient
resource allocation for nonpoint control on individual farms. The specific tax for any
given farm is constructed to equal the mathematical expectation of the water quality
damage costs of the farmers' choices. Such taxes are shown to induce fanners to choose
those practices that minimize the sum of the environmental damage costs caused by their
actions and the cost they incur in attempting to control their external water quality
effects. The taxes provide fanners with the flexibility needed to choose cost-effective
control practices, but provide fanners with incentives to use this flexibility in a socially
desirable manner. Design standards cannot accomplish this outcome because they neither
permit farmers the flexibility to fully utilize their specialized knowledge to minimize
their pollution control costs nor provide them with adequate guidance about the offsite
costs of their actions. Estimated performance standards fail because they are in fact no
more than complex design standards. For example, in a given situation some set of264 J. W. Dunn and J. S. Shortle
practices would yield a value of the USLE less than or equal to a specified number.
Hence, to require that a farmer maintain the value of the USLE below some value would
mean restricting the fanner's practices to this set. The relative weakness of estimated
performance incentives, although they provide complete flexibility, is the mathematical
impossibility of constructing tax schedules based on estimated pollution flows that will
equal the expected environmental damage costs of a farmer's decisions.
One obvious question at this point is how to identify the optimal tax schedule for
each farm. This schedule, as noted above, must be the mathematical expectation of the
external costs of the fanner's management decisions. The imposition of the optimal
economic tax would require sufficient knowledge of damage costs to justify its use in
defining such tax schedules. The consensus among economists is that too little is known
about damage costs to use them in specifying pollution control incentives. If this is the
case, then too little is also known to choose between policies on the basis of expected net
benefits. However, the results noted above will hold for a second-best criterion that
involves substituting a social penalty function provided by public decision makers for the
unknown damage cost function based on the preferences of individuals. Support for such
an approach can be found in the considerable literature on evaluating public projects
with benefits that cannot be measured in dollar terms (e.g., Eckstein 1961; Freeman
1977).
A second problem, whether a first- or second-best criterion of the type suggested
above is employed, occurs because the external costs of one farmer's actions are contin-
gent upon the actions of others. For example, the environmental cost of additional
nutrient loads from farms is contingent upon the nutrient flows from point sources and
other nonpoint sources. Because of such interdependencies, the optimal tax for farm B
must be contingent upon the behavior of farm A and vice versa. This means identifying
the optimal tax for farm B requires a precise understanding of how farm A will respond
to its tax, and vice versa. But this understanding requires that the public sector acquire
the fanners' specialized private knowledge.
The problem of needing to know the individual costs of pollution control to design
efficient or even cost-effective policies also arises in the context of efficient point source
pollution control, and three basic approaches that do not rely on the altruism of the
polluters have been identified for attempting such information transfers for the point
source case. One is transferable discharge permit schemes in which polluters reveal their
specialized knowledge by revealing their demand in pollution rights markets. The sec-
ond approach is the use of very complex public choice mechanisms (e.g., CoUinge and
Bailey 1983; Dasgupta et al. 1980; Kerwel 1977). These mechanisms involve asking
individuals for the specialized private information needed to make efficient social deci-
sions. The information provided by all the polluters is used to construct economic incen-
tives in such a way that the best policy of an individual is to tell the truth when respond-
ing to the request for information. The third approach involves trial-and-error search
procedures of varying complexity (e.g., Opaluch 1984).
Of these approaches, the first, although interesting as a means to improve the effi-
ciency of point source pollution control, is probably inappropriate for agricultural pollu-
tion control because of the stochastic and unobservable nature of agricultural pollution
loads. The key problem is what to trade. It could be rights to contribute to the estimated
agricultural load. There would be two problems with this approach. One is that comput-
ing the individual contributions when making trades using complex estimation models
could be prohibitively cumbersome. Another is that averages are in all likelihood only
one relevant statistic. As noted above, if the health of the bay depends upon the variabil-Agriculture Nonpoint Source Pollution Control 265
ity of pollution loads in addition to their averages, then variances and other moments of
the distribution of agricultural loads are important. Efficient control would require mar-
kets for contributions to all relevant moments, which would certainly be too cumber-
some to be practical.
The trial-and-error procedure basically involves announcing pollution prices and
observing the resulting pollution levels to generate data that can be used to estimate
abatement cost functions. Because of the complexity of the technology and economics of
agricultural pollution, and the stochastic and unobservable nature of the pollution, the
use of a trial-and-error approach to gain usefUl knowledge about the farm-specific eco-
nomics of agricultural abatement would pose a tremendous experimental design prob-
lem. Moreover, the process could be quite costly in both resources used in learning and
also in adjustment costs. For these and other reasons, this type of approach seems to be
of little practical interest.
Shortle and Dunn (1986b) have demonstrated that a public choice mechanism devel-
oped by Dasgupta et al. (1980) for efficient point source control could be adapted to
derive the optimal farm-specific taxes given a probabilistic model for relating changes in
farm management to aggregate pollution loads. The procedure would involve first asking
farmers to send the government reports that can be used to determine the profits of
alternative management practices on each farm. The information reported by all of the
farmers would be used in combination with nonpoint loading models, pollution loads
from other sources, and environmental damage cost models to derive the farm-specific
tax schedules. After a period of time following the receipt of their tax schedules, the
farmers would be asked to report their management practices and make their tax pay-
ments. If the practices reported by a farmer are economically inconsistent with the
information provided in the information transfer stage, then the farmer is deemed to
have made a false transfer of specialized knowledge and is penalized. This checking,
along with the uncertainty farmers face about the taxes that will be imposed upon them
when reporting their specialized knowledge, make telling the truth the dominant strategy
of those who seek to maximize after-tax profits. However, as with the above approaches,
this approach is of little practical interest because of its cost and complexity. Hence, for
now the method of agricultural pollution control that is optimal in theory is infeasible in
practice.
When the public choice is limited by political, informational, or other constraints to
policies that are not theoretically optimal, then relative efficiency becomes an empirical
question. For example, it has been demonstrated that the relative efficiency of linear
emissions taxes and marketable permits, neither of which is efficient in theory in an
uncertain world, depends on the relative slopes of the marginal abatement cost and
benefit functions (Adar and Griffin 1976; Fishelson 1976; Weitzman 1974; Yohe 1976).
Hence, analysis of the relative efficiency of these suboptimal strategies in a given situa-
tion would require estimation of the relevant economic relationships. Analysis of subop-
timal forms of agricultural abatement programs has provided similar results, showing,
for example, that the relative efficiency of performance standards and incentives based
on nonpoint pollution loading models will vary from place to place with variations in
certain features of the models and the pollution control benefit and cost functions (Shor-
tle 1984). Unfortunately, the existing knowledge about the linkages between farm man-
agement practices and water quality, and the costs of pollution abatement on farms is far
from adequate for extensive economic evaluation of alternative strategies.266 J. W. Dunn and J. S. Shortle
Practical Economics
Under present circumstances it would seem that the most that can be hoped for in the
near term is policies that are economically sensible. This would mean policies that
provide real progress while at the same time promoting least-cost control on farms and
an allocation of abatement among polluters that approximates a least-cost allocation
reasonably well, given the information available. The latter means generally poor
knowledge of the on-farm costs and only crude knowledge of the linkages between farm
management practices and water quality.
The prototypical state program for agricultural pollution control mirrors traditional
U.S. soil conservation policy. Education is used to inform farmers of their social respon-
sibility, techniques of pollution control, and perhaps to suggest, in some instances, that
environmentally sound fanning practices may be more profitable than conventional prac-
tices (EPA 1984). Farmers who choose to act are provided with technical assistance to
help them develop and implement plans. They may also be provided with financial
incentives to participate in the form of cost-sharing and tax breaks that reduce their cost
to implementing control practices.
The potential effectiveness of this voluntary approach is considerable in principle. If
the prodding of the educational dimension doesn't work, then cost-sharing incentives,
which could be structured into outright bribes if necessary, may be successful. Less than
100% cost-sharing can be effective when the qualifying control practices yield some
immediate or near-term benefits to the farmer. For example, whereas manure storage (a
practice that can help improve the timing of nutrient applications to reduce nutrient
runoff) can be profitable without cost-sharing on larger farms, providing adequate cost-
sharing subsidies can make manure storage structures economically attractive on smaller
farms (Shortle et al. 1986; Young and Crowder 1987). Other effective control practices,
such as fencing to exclude livestock from stream banks, are of little or no benefit to the
farmer. Adequate cost-shares for such practices exceed 100%. But as long as the public
authorities are willing to make the funds available and set cost-share rates high enough to
induce farmers to adopt effective practices, this approach can succeed.
However, neither the long experience with this approach for soil conservation nor
the more limited experience for agricultural nonpoint pollution control are encouraging
with respect to its effectiveness in practice (Epp and Shortle 1985; U.S. GAO 1982,
1983). Moreover, if substantial continuing funding is required to achieve control targets
for agricultural sources, a question for which the answer is not now known, other issues
must be raised. One is the extent to which taxpayers are willing to subsidize pollution
control in agriculture, especially in view of the severe strains on state and federal budg-
ets and the widespread criticism of subsidies for agriculture that now exist. Fairness is
also an issue, since industrial point sources must now bear the burden of their mandated
clean-up efforts. Both the public and policymakers have widely accepted the "polluter
pays" principle for nonagricultural sources of air and water pollution. Shouldn't "pol-
luters pays" also apply to agricultural sources?
In addition to questions about the effectiveness, fairness, and long-term political
acceptability of the prototypical approach, there are questions about its potential eco-
nomic efficiency. The cost-effectiveness of pollution abatement in agriculture depends in
large measure upon the extent to which farmers are encouraged to use least-cost control
practices on their farms and the extent to which farms with low control costs participate
relative to farms with higher control costs. Cost-sharing is typically restricted to struc-
tural practices, but such practices may not provide for least-cost control (e.g.. YoungAgriculture Nonpoint Source Pollution Control 267
and Crowder 1987). Although cost-sharing rates are traditionally uniform among partici-
pants, rates that vary with farm size, location, and other factors would be more cost-
effective (Park and Sawyer 1985; Shortle et al. 1986). Broadening cost-sharing eligibil-
ity to cover all changes in farm resource allocation for pollution control and the use of
variable cost-share rates would improve the cost-effectiveness of the approach, but the
heterogeneity of farms and differential information severely limit the possibilities.
An approach that combines design taxes with design standards makes better eco-
nomic sense in the near term. Design standards could be used to prohibit activities that
are environmentally unacceptable. For example, many pesticides are considered to be
too harmful to permit their use and have been banned.
Less objectionable activities could be taxed, with the tax schedule reflecting an
assessment of relative environmental harm. For example, no-till farming with little pes-
ticide and fertilizer use could be assigned a zero tax. From there, the tax could be
adjusted upward as more fertilizer or pesticides are used, or as more erosive tillage
practices are used. The basic schedule could also be adjusted to reflect the local topogra-
phy, proximity to waterways, and so forth.
Although damages cannot be estimated easily, some estimate of relative environmen-
tal harm of different practices can be made. A tax schedule that reflects these assess-
ments will send a message to farmers about the off-farm costs of their actions, encourag-
ing them to use more environmentally benign practices.
Design regulations combined with design taxes can be used to make real progress in
reducing agricultural pollution. Of course, failure to impose significant restrictions or
adequate tax rates would result in little progress, but inadequate implementation would
make any approach ineffective. Unlike the prototypical approach, the effectiveness of
this approach would not depend on the altruism of farmers or the continuing willingness
of taxpayers to subsidize pollution control in agriculture.
In addition, design taxes should perform relatively well in practice, as well as in
theory, in meeting the challenge of providing farmers with the flexibility needed for cost-
effective control while influencing the use of this flexibility in socially desirable ways.
This is because design taxes permit farmers to utilize fully specialized knowledge of
their own farm operations, yet can convey at least as much, and generally more, infor-
mation to fanners about the expected external costs of their management decisions than
design standards or performance-based strategies. Whereas the expected costs in the
usual economic sense cannot be identified, it is possible to devise other weighing
schemes and implement them through design tax structures. When the preferences of
public decision makers are communicated in this manner, the farmer must determine
how to meet them at least-cost. This feature along with tax rate structures that vary
according to hydrological considerations should make reasonably cost-effective control
possible while requiring much less information than the cost-sharing approach.
The main practical shortcoming of this approach is its political palatability. Under
this strategy farmers would bear the cost of changes in resource allocation for pollution
control plus making tax payments. It is highly unlikely that a program that imposes such
a burden on farmers could gain the political support needed for implementation. How-
ever, if cost-effectiveness is an important consideration in policy design, then this prob-
lem could be diminished by adding lumpsum subsidies to the design taxes.
Lumpsum subsidies, meaning transfers to individuals that are unrelated to any deci-
sions made by them, can be used to reduce the burden of design taxes and perhaps to
reward farmers outright for pollution control. In general, the more pollution control
effort a farmer makes, the less the design tax payments. Depending upon the level of268 J. W. Dunn and J. S. Shortle
subsidy, fanners may actually pay little or no tax and bear little of the economic burden
of changes in production practices or even come out ahead. For example, suppose that
when faced by the design tax, a farmer undertakes pollution control measures that
reduce jiretaji profits by $100 dollars and that result in design tax payments of $50. A
lumpsum subsidy of $$0 or more would mean no real tax burden and subsidies of $150
or more would mean that the farmer come out ahead.
Many of the usual criticisms of subsidy programs could be applied in varying mea-
sure to a program of this type (e.g., see Harrington et al. 1985). However, this approach
would seem to have the promise of providing as cost-effective control as can be hoped
for at this time while also having politically attractive features. In addition, this approach
could probably be adjusted with experience to impose a much smaller drain on public
budgets than the cost-sharing approach since the lumpsum subsidies could be financed in'
part or perhaps entirely by the design tax receipts.
Another dimension of an economically sensible approach to agricultural pollution
abatement is continued research to improve the understanding of the linkages between
farm management and water quality and to better understand the economics of nonpoint
pollution control. Initial programs are bound to have fiaws, especially given the poor
state of current knowledge and the fundamental complexity of the problem. Active and
formal learning from experience along with formal research can be used to diminish the
uncertainties and improve the cost-effectiveness of control with the passage of time.
References
Adar, Z., and J. M. Griffin. 1976. Uncertainty and the choice of pollution control instruments.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 3:178-188.
Alt, Klaus F., and E. Heady. 1977. Economics and the environment: Impacts of erosion restraint
on crop production in the Iowa River Basin. CARD Report 75.
Baumol, W. J., and W. E. Oates. 1979. Economics, Environmental Policy, and the Quality of Life.
Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall.
Beavis, B., and M. Walker. 1983. Achieving environmental standards with stochastic discharges.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 10:103-111.
Bohm, P., and C. S. Russell. 1985. Comparative analysis of alternative policy instruments. In
Handbook of Natural Resource Economics, Vol. 1, edited by A. V. Kneese and J. L. Sweeney.
New York: Elsevier Science.
Boggess, W., et al. 1980. Sediment damage and farm production costs—A multiple objective
analysis. North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics 2:109-112.
Collinge, R. A., and M. J. Bailey. 1983. Optimal quasi-market choice in the presence of external-
ities. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 10:221-232.
Crowder, B. M. 1987. Issues in water quality modeling of agricultural management practices: An
economic perspective. In Monitoring, Modeling, and Mediating Water Quality, edited by
Stephen D. Nix and Peter E. Black. Bethesda: American Water Resources Association, pp.
313-334.
Dasgupta, P., P. J. Hammond, and E. Maskin. 1980. A note on imperfect information and optimal
pollution control. Review of Economic Studies 47:857-860.
DeCoursey, D. G. 1985. Mathematical models for nonpoint water pollution control. Journal of
Soil and Water Conservation 40:508-513.
Eckstein, O. 1961. A survey of public expenditure criteria. Public Finance: Needs, Sources, and
Utilization. Universities-National Bureau Committee on Economic Research. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Environmental Protection Agency—Chesapeake Bay Program. 1983. Chesapeake Bay: A frame-
work for action.Agriculture Nonpoint Source Pollution Control 269
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water Program Operations. 1984. Report to Con-
gress: Nonpoint pollution in the U.S. Washington, DC.
Epp, D. J., and J. S. Shortle. 1985. Agricultural nonpoint source pollution control: Mandatory or
voluntary? Journal of Soil and Whtir Conservation 40:111-114. •
Fishelson, G. 1976. Emissions control policies under uncertainty. Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management 3:189-197.
Freeman, A. M., III. 1977. Project design and evaluation with multiple objectives. In Public
Expenditures and Policy Analysis, 2nd ed., edited by Robert H. Haveman and Julius Margo-
lis. Chicago: Rand-McNally, pp. 239-256.
Griffm, R., and D. Bromley. 1982. Agricultural runoff as a nonpoint externality. American Jour-
nal of Agricultural Economics 64:547-552.
Harrington, W, A. J. Krupnick, and H. M. Peskin. 1985. Policies for nonpointrsource pollution
control. Journal of Soil and Witer Conservation 40:27-32.
Kerwel, E. 1977. To tell the truth: Imperfect information and optimal pollution control. Review of
Economic Studies 44:595-601.
Kramer, R. A., W. T. McSweeny, and R. W. Stavros. 1983. Soil conservation with uncertain
revenues and input supplies. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 4:694-702.
McSweeny, W. T., and J. S. Shortle. 1987. Nutrient application rates under uncertainty. Staff
Paper No. 132, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Pennsylva-
nia State University.
Miranowski, J., M. J. Monson, J. S. Shortle, and L. D. Zinser. 1983. Effects of agricultural land
use on stream water quality: Economic analysis. Final Report to the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency. Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service.
Opaluch, J. J. 1984. Dynamic aspects of effluent taxation under uncertainty. Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management 11:1-13.
Park, W. M., and D. G. Sawyer. 1985. Targeting soil erosion control efforts in a critical water-
shed. Staff Paper AGE5850801, U.S. Department of Agricultural Economic Research Ser-
vice.
Seitz, W. D., P M. Gardner, S. K. Grove, K. L. Guntermann, J. R. Karr, R. G. F. Spitze, E. R.
Swanson, C. R. Taylor, D. L. Uchtmann, and J. C. Van Es. 1978. Alternative policies for
controlling nonpoint agricultural sources of water pollution. Washington DC: U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Environmental Research Laboratory.
Shortle, J. S. 1984. The use of estimated pollution flows in agricultural pollution control policy:
Implications for abatement and policy instruments. Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and
Resource Economics 13:277-283.
Shortle, J. S. 1987. Allocative implication of comparisons between the marginal costs of point and
nonpoint source pollution abatement. Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Eco-
nomics 16:17-23.
Shortle, J. S., and J. W. Dunn. 1986a. The relative efficiency of agricultural source water pollu-
tion control policies. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 68:668-677.
Shortle, J. S., and J. W. Dunn. 1986b. The specification of efficient agricultural nonpoint source
pollution control policies. Staff Paper No. 119, Department of Agricultural Economics and
Rural Sociology, The Pennsylvania State University
Shortle, J. S., C. E. Young, and M. K. Akerman. 1986. Economic evaluation of the St. Albans
Bay, Vermont RCWP project. U.S. Department of Agriculture—Economic Research Service.
Taylor, R. C, and K. K. Frohberg. 1977. The welfare effects of erosion controls, banning
pesticides, and limiting fertilizer application in the corn belt. American Journal of Agricul-
tural Economics 59:25-36.
U.S. General Accounting Office. 1982. Cleaning up the environment: Progress achieved but
major unresolved issues remain. Washington, DC.
U.S. General Accounting Office. 1983. Agriculture's soil conservation programs miss fiillpoten-
tial in the fight against soil erosion.
Weitzman, M. 1974. Prices vs. quantities. Review of Economic Studies. 41:477-491.'270 J. W. Dunn and J. S. Shortle
White, G. P., and E. Partenheimer. 1980. Economic impacts of erosion and sedimentation control
plans: Case studies of Pennsylvania dairy farms. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation
35:76-78.
Wishmeir, W., and D. Smith. 1978. Predicting rainfall-erosion losses—A guide to conservation
planning. AH-537. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Science and Education Administration.
Yohe, G. 1976. Substitution and the control of pollution. A comparison of effluent charges and
quantity standards under uncertainty. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
3:312-323.
Young, C. E., and B. M. Crowder. 1987. Managing nutrient losses: Some empirical results on the
potential water quality effects.
Young, C. E., B. M. Crowder, J. S. ShorUe, and J. R. Alwang. 1985. Nutrient management on
farms in Southeastern Pennsylvania. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 40:443-445.
Zinser, L. D., J. M. Miranowski, J. S. Shortle, and M. M. Monson. 1985. Effects of rising
relative energy prices on soil erosion and its control. American Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics 67:558-562.